requestId:68499ab3cbea97.68775002.
The moral and meaning of emotions are important to Mencius’s “four ends”
Author: Zhao Guangming
Source: “Zhi Luxury Journal” 2017 Issue 5
Time: Confucius was in the 2568th year of Dingyou Xuanyue Dingwei
Jesus November 16, 2017
To understand Kant’s emotional thinking, one must have a overall grasp of the differences in his different contexts in order to expose the profound meaning of emotions on his moral philosophy and even the entire critical philosophy. Kant’s emotional thinking is both very different and in-depth related to the emotional thinking in Sugratland. This article will focus on evaluating the moral and meaning of emotions in his view, and use it to highlight Mencius’s four ends (four virtues).
The moral problem begins with moral basics. The relationship is closely related to the foundation of morality. The differences in understanding and attitudes about feelings will lead to differences in moral basics and merit. In the basis of the reflection and criticism of Sugrats and Kant’s philosophical philosophy of Sugrats, Max Scheller took a look at the slightest sense of ethics:
For ethics, the result is that it may be constructed in its history as an absolute ethics of acquired ethics, followed by perceptual ethics, or perhaps constructed as a relatively experienced and emotional ethics. Almost no one has ever asked: whether there is no absolute and emotional ethics. [1] (p.308)
(Unfortably acquired) The important representative of perceptual ethics is Kant’s ethics, which is a relative experience and emotional ethics refer to the ethics represented by Sugratland’s Cummondians. Generally speaking, the former uses sensibility as the basis of moral character, while the latter uses emotions as the basis of moral character. Scheller is not satisfied with the abstraction of sensibility, nor is he satisfied with the relative relationship between experiencing emotions, but creates an absolute emotional ethics. These three seemingly distinct ethics actually have something in common, that is, they all have their own stability and fairness. This stability and fairness start from the stability and fairness of moral foundation. Ethics should lay a foundation of stability, fairness and even absoluteness in their own ways, even ethics that are considered based on relative experience and emotions will be no exception. The assessment of Xiushu and Yadon Smith will prove this.
1. A broad vision and fair viewer
“Sensibility is, and should be just a slave to feelings, and except for serving and serving, feelings must not claim to have any other duties” (2.3.3) [2] (p.360), please don’t like this famous oneIn other words, although it is a bit exaggerated, the idea is to restrain the unique style of sensibility and place experience and emotions at the basic position of moral philosophy. This is the common understanding of the Suglanese Kymonds. However, this does not seem to be a denial of the sensibility itself, but only a denial of its absolute authority. The goal is to return the sensibility to a suitable position and share the overall harmony of the soul with the feelings.
In the era of silence, the important words that express emotions are affection and password. silence uses the password that expresses the color of secular desire to express the most basic emotions of human beings. The moral emotions that are regarded as moral foundation are in terms of moral sense (Hutchison) and moral sentiments (Wuch, Smith). The question is, how can emotions provide a stable foundation for morality? Experienced emotions are always specific, changing and relative, and moral feelings are often full of personalities. If moral judgments and evaluations are based on emotions, how should we deal with differences and inconsistencies between the subject itself and the different subjects? “The distinction between moral goodness and evil is based on happiness and suffering” (3.2.8) [2] (p.474). If, as I said, moral goodness and evil are real and private feelings based on happiness and suffering, then the general moral evaluation will not exist. Don’t understand this very well, and he added annotations to this sentence. In this annotation, he explained on the one hand, thinking that “the general sentiments of human beings are such differences”, and wanted to use this to scrutinize the relative nature of bitter feelings to increase their stability and disagreement; on the other hand, he wrote in a preservation manner, “As for what meaning we can consider morality, revision or aesthetics, and correct or wrong taste (taste) in the future.”
The question of valuation or interest is a valuation problem, and it is the most basic thing about aesthetics and morality. The assessment of this is now in the article “The Standard of Interest”. “It is natural to seek a standard of interest. It is a principle that can coordinate various different feelings among people; at most, it is a judgment that can determine one feeling and responsibly take responsibility for another” [3] (p.95). Here, it is not clear that interest or stake is not purely private and relative, but has a different standard. The stake is the ordinary principle of coordinating the differences in one’s own feelings and the differences between people. To this end, the discrimination and sensitive feelings and imagination are required, and “removing all prejudice” [3] (p.104). To dispel prejudice and seek the difference between feelings are the basic agenda of moral and emotional problems and consciences. These are realized through sympathy, and this reality also means modification of sympathy. Don’t consider sympathy as the soul and the principle of unity in the emotional world (2.2.5) [2] (p.316). It is necessary to explain that the concept of sympathy in the beginning is not a virtue of sanctity or benevolence.It is not all the so-called feelings, but a spiritual function with the effectiveness of providing information. It is the preface for the ability to pass on emotions between different subjects to form a common geese. In the sympathy of this kind of relationship is distributed to friends, shared and shared, it will lead to a feeling of success and non-compliance, which is the basis of moral feelings [4] (p.92).
From this point of view, firstly, sympathy is a principle that is extremely powerful in humanity; secondly, sympathy has a great impact on our beauty; thirdly, sympathy produces our moral feelings in the virtues of all human beings. Therefore, we can assume that sympathy also provokes other virtues (3.3.1) [2] (p.500).
After confirming the grand humanistic meaning of sympathy, we should point out the limitations of sympathy:
However, because this sympathy is often changed, people may think that our moral feelings must also allow all these same changes. We are more sympathetic to people close to each other than those far away: we are more sympathetic to acquaintances than to strangers, and we are more sympathetic to our own people than to foreigners. However, regardless of the changes in our sympathy, we will give the same reputation for the same moral character, whether in China or in the UK. They all appear to be equally moral and are equally respected by a wise speculator. The changes of sympathy and nursing the website are not accompanied by the changes we respect. Therefore, our respect does not come from sympathy (3.3.1). [2](p.503)
The blood, partner, love and other similarities, close relationships, as well as the vicinity of time and space, etc. between individuals will affect the consequences of sympathy. When sympathy is misused, blood and ethnic programs have blackened Ye’s reputation and embarked on the path of celebrities step by step. In the end, the already secret relationships such as entertainment, sects, and party will be further strengthened, and private party members will distort morality and social fairness. Therefore, although sympathy is the basic channel of conflict between the subject’s emotional communication, its changes, single aspects and private needs have been modified. Moral evaluations and respect are based on sympathy, but not from sympathy, and sympathy needs to be modified by “wise besieged viewers”. “Sensible Person” reminds people of Adam Smith’s “fair Person”, which aims to abandon prejudice, to abandon the narrowness and special perspectives of individual emotions, and to seek the initiation of the subjective relationship, which is very stressful and often works overtime. The difference, ordinary, and general nature between them. This general nature must be the soul place of moral emotions.ref=”https://www.taiwanlovelog.com/Penny/%e5%8c%85%e9%a4%8a%e6%94%b9%e8%ae%8a%e6%88%91%e9%81%8e%e5%8e%bb%e7%9a%84%e7%94%9f%e6%b4%bb/”>Baobao.com:
If we each only consider our temperament and personality based on our own unique perspective, then we cannot travel all the way with any fair method. Therefore, in order to avoid constant conflicts and achieve a more stable judgment on things, we have established a stable and general point of View) … It is obvious that a beautiful face brings pleasure 20 steps away from us is not as big as we are close to us, but we won’t say it doesn’t look that beautiful: because we understand what it will have in this position, and through reflection (reflexion) we modified its tempor
發佈留言